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Abstract
The security of a password authentication scheme using smart cards proposed by Liao et al. [I.-E. Liao, C.-C. Lee, M.-S. Hwang,
A password authentication scheme over insecure networks, J. Comput. System Sci. 72 (2006) 727–740] is analyzed. Three kinds
of attacks are presented in different scenarios.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recently, Liao et al. gave ten requirements for evaluating a password authentication scheme [1]. They also proposed
a new scheme using smart cards for password authentication over insecure networks and claimed that it satisfied all
the ten requirements and thus is immune to various attacks. In this paper, however, some security loopholes of their
scheme will be pointed out and the corresponding attacks will be described.
2. Liao et al.’s scheme
In this section, Liao et al.’s scheme will be briefly reviewed. Some notations will be given. Then, the registration
phase, the login phase, and the authentication phase of their scheme will be described in turn. The procedures of
changing password will also be stated.
2.1. Notations
In order to facilitate future references, frequently used notations are listed below with their descriptions.
S: server,
C: client,
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PW: the password of C,
x: the long secret key of S,
p: a large prime number,
g: the primitive element in Galois field GF(p),
R: a random number,
T : time stamp,
h(·): a public collision-free one-way hash function,
‖: concatenation operation.
2.2. Registration phase
In this phase, everyone who wants to register at the server should obtain a smart card. The server S selects a large
prime number p and a primitive number g in GF(p). Moreover, he also selects a collision-free on-way hash function
h(·) and a long secret key x. Then the client C begins his registration at the server S as follows.
(1) C freely chooses his ID and PW , and calculates h(PW). C then sends ID and h(PW) to S through a secure
channel.
(2) S calculates B = gh(x‖ID)+h(PW) mod p. S then issues C a smart card which contains ID, B , p, and g through a
secure channel.
2.3. Login phase
Once the client wants to login to the server, he should first insert his smart card to the terminal, and keys in his ID
and PW . Then, the server and the smart card will perform the following login steps.
(1) C sends his ID to S.
(2) S generates a random number R, and calculates B ′′ = gh(x‖ID)R mod p, where x is S’s secret key known to
himself only. He also calculates h(B ′′). Then, S sends h(B ′′) and R to C.
(3) C calculates B ′ = (Bg−h(PW))R mod p. Then he checks whether h(B ′) = h(B ′′). If so, the identity of server is
authenticated. C then calculates V = h(T ‖ B ′), where T is the time stamp of this login, and sends login request
containing ID, V , and T to S. Otherwise, the server is rejected.
2.4. Authentication phase
This phase is executed by the server to determine whether the client is allowed to login or not. S executes the
following steps to verify the legitimacy of C.
(1) S checks the correctness of the format of ID. If it is invalid, the login request is rejected.
(2) S generates the time stamp T ′ upon receiving C’s login request. Then compares T with T ′, if T ′ − T > T , the
login request is rejected, where T is the tolerance for transmission delay.
(3) S computes V ′ = h(T ‖ B ′′), and then checks whether V is equal to V ′. The login request is accepted only if they
are identical.
2.5. Change password
This phase will be invoked if the client wants to change his password from PW to PW ′.
(1) C selects a new password PW ′.
(2) C computes Y = gh(PW ′) mod p, Z = Bg−h(PW) mod p, and β = YZ, where PW is the old password and B is
the variable stored in the smart card.
(3) Assign B = β in the smart card.
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The scheme can be extended to support Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol if some minor modifications are
made in the login phase and the authentication phase.
In the login phase, after receiving C’s ID, S selects a random number m, and calculates M = gm mod p and
h(B ′′ ‖ M). Then S sends h(B ′′ ‖ M), R, and M to C. Upon receiving the message, C verifies whether h(B ′ ‖
M) = h(B ′′ ‖ M). If the equality holds, the server is authenticated. C selects a random number n and calculates
N = gn mod p and V = h(T ‖ B ′ ‖ N). Then C sends ID, V , N , and T to S.
In the authentication phase, S needs to calculate V ′ = h(T ‖ B ′′ ‖ N) and then checks whether V ′ equals to V . If
it is, S accepts the login request; otherwise, S rejects it.
Other procedures and calculations not mentioned here are the same as in the previous description. After successful
authentication, S and C can share the common secret session key K = Mn mod p = Nm mod p = gmn mod p to
perform encryption/decryption using traditional symmetric cryptosystems.
3. Cryptanalysis of Liao et al.’s scheme
In Liao et al.’s scheme introduced in the previous section, the verification table is eliminated in the server. This
elimination not only enhances the security of the scheme, but also alleviates the overhead of computation and storage
for the server. Clients can freely choose their identity and password. What’s more, they can easily change the password
without the participation of the server. However, some security loopholes still exist and will be described in this
section.
3.1. Offline password guessing
In password authentication schemes that the user is allowed to choose his password, the user tends to choose
a password that can be easily remembered for his convenience. However, these easy-to-remember passwords are
potentially vulnerable to password guessing attack, in which an adversary can try to guess the user’s password and
then verify his guess. In general, the password guessing attack can be classified into online password guessing attack
and offline password guessing attack. The adversary tries to use guessed passwords iteratively to pass the verification
of the server in an online manner in online password guessing attack. While in offline password attack, the adversary
intercepts some password-related messages exchanged between the user and the server, and then iteratively guesses
the user’s password and verifies whether his guess is correct or not in an offline manner. Online password guessing
attacks can be easily thwarted by limiting the number of continuous login attempts within a short period. In an offline
password guessing attack, since there is no need for the server to participate in the verification, the server cannot easily
notice the attack. While in password authentication scheme using smart cards, two points should be noticed to resist
this kind of attack. One is that the password should not be transmitted between the client and the server during the
authentication, otherwise it has the risk of being intercepted and recovered. The other is that the sensitive data stored
in smart cards should be well protected so that the password would not be leaked even if smart cards are lost and all
the data inside are disclosed. Although Liao et al. claim that their scheme is secure even when the client’s smart card
is lost [1], an offline password attack method will be given here as a counterexample.
Suppose the client’s smart card is lost, an attacker can read all the data, including ID, B , p, and g, from the smart
card via physically access to the storage medium. He then starts a service request by sending ID to S. Upon receiving
the request, S will send him h(B ′′) and R. If the server is legal, the attacker can perform the offline password guessing
once he receives these data. For the legal S, B ′′ = B ′, so h(B ′) = h(B ′′) = h((Bg−h(PW))R mod p). Since B , R, p,
and g are all known to the attacker and h(·) is a public hash function, the attacker can guess the value of PW and
verify his guess by the equation h((Bg−h(PW))R mod p) = h(B ′′).
This attack is still effective when key agreement is added. In this case, upon receiving the attacker’s login request,
the legal server S will send him h(B ′′ ‖ M), R, and M . Now he needs to guess the value of PW to meet the requirement
of h(B ′′ ‖ M) = h(((Bg−h(PW))R mod p) ‖ M).
3.2. Impersonating the server by replay attack
A good password authentication scheme can achieve mutual authentication. That means not only the server can
verify the legitimacy of users, but users can also verify the legitimacy of server. Meanwhile, any illegal one cannot
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no one can impersonate a legal user to login to the server [1]. However, the situation of impersonating the server is
omitted. Here, two methods will be described for an intruder to impersonate the legal server during the authentication.
Replay attack refers to retransmission of previously intercepted invalid message. In password authentication
schemes, replay attack is usually concerned in the case of a illegal client attempts to impersonate a legal one by
replaying previously intercepted invalid message to the server. Actually, similar efforts can be made to impersonate
the server.
In Liao et al.’s scheme, client’s time stamp is utilized to resist replay attack for impersonating a legal user. However,
the message sent from the server is time independent, which gives a possibility of replaying his message to clients.
Suppose an adversary intercepts the message sent by S, i.e. h(B ′′) and R, in the second step of login phase during a
client’s authentication procedures. Next time, when this client starts another new service request by sending ID to S,
the adversary intercepts it and sends the previously intercepted h(B ′′) and R back to him. As h(B ′′) contains the valid
secret key x of S and the client’s ID, the client cannot distinguish the replayed R. As a result, the adversary will pass
the authentication and is considered as a legal server in the third step of login phase. A limitation of this method is
that the adversary can only impersonate himself as the legal server towards the client whose ID is contained in the
intercepted h(B ′′). For other client whose identity is ID′, this attack will not work as h(B ′) = gh(x‖ID′)R = h(B ′′) =
gh(x‖ID)R . Even so, a sophisticated adversary can intercept and store a list of triples 〈ID, h(B ′′),R〉. After intercepting
a new service request containing ID, he finds an entry of record by the value of ID. If it is found, he then replays the
corresponding h(B ′′) and R to that client. Otherwise, he waits for the real legal server’s response, intercepts it, and
adds the new triple to the list.
When key agreement is considered, the adversary can still replay the intercepted h(B ′′ ‖ M), R and M to the client
and pass the authentication. However, as he does not know the exponent m to generate M (M = gm mod p), solving
which is a discrete logarithm problem that is believed to be intractable nowadays. Therefore he cannot figure out the
shared session key K during the following communication.
3.3. Denial-of-service attack on password changing
In password authentication, Denial-of-service (DoS) attack can cause permanent error on authentication by in-
troducing unexpected data during the procedures of authentication. The most vulnerable procedure is the password
changing phase since it usually refreshes the data on storage. If an attacker can modify the password, or tamper the
message containing password with valid data format, the updated password or its related verification data will then
be different from what the client expects. The client can never pass the subsequent authentication thereby. In Liao et
al.’s scheme, the password changing phase is performed on the client terminal with smart cards, i.e., the client can
change his password without communicating with the server [1]. This enhances the security of password changing
as no sensitive message need to be transmitted over the insecure network. Meanwhile, it relieves the overhead of
server. However, due to the drawbacks of design, it is still possible to load a DoS attack on password changing in their
scheme.
Suppose an attacker temporarily gets access to the client C’s smart card, he then inserts the card in a terminal
device and performs the following operations. He randomly selects two different passwords PW∗ and PW ′ as the old
and the new password, respectively. Then he sends a changing password request to the smart card. As described in
the previous section, the smart card will then compute Y = gh(PW ′) mod p, Z = Bg−h(PW∗) mod p, and β = YZ =
gh(PW
′)Bg−h(PW∗) mod p = gh(PW ′)gh(x‖ID)+h(PW)g−h(PW∗) mod p = gh(x‖ID)+h(PW)−h(PW∗)+h(PW ′), then it replaces
B with β . From then on, C can never pass the password authentication by the server. This is because in the login
phase, C cannot verify the legal server in the second step. Moreover, he cannot be verified by the server in the last
step of authentication phase.
4. Conclusion
In [1], Liao et al. proposed a password authentication scheme using smart cards and demonstrated its immunity
against various attacks. However, after review of their scheme and analysis of its security, three kinds of attacks, i.e.,
offline password guessing attack, replay attack, and DoS attack, are presented in different scenarios. The analyses
show that the scheme is insecure for practical application.
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